Since the launch of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine by Vladimir Putin a year ago, it has caused an unusually high level of support among the Russian public for the Russian authorities and Putin himself. Even though pro-Kremlin sociologists claim that lack of stability is having a negative impact on public sentiment, it does not affect the ratings of trust in the country's leadership. Therefore, Moscow is not only dragging out the war but also trying to draw the entire Russian society into the conflict.
Even though pro-Kremlin sociologists say that the majority of Russian society remains apolitical and the level of involvement in the military effort is steadily declining, the number of radical patriots who actively support the war is steadily growing. This is facilitated by massive propaganda, mobilization, and an active policy of involving the population in the military effort, starting with the teaching of mandatory war propaganda in schools. The Kremlin's stake in these radical "national patriots" represents the second major reason why Putin cannot end this war.
Moreover, the public ratings of not only federal but also regional as well as local authorities depend on their degree of involvement in the war. Support for the special military operation guarantees votes in elections and has influenced the growing popularity of specific governors. As a result, both federal and regional authorities are trying to stand out as much as possible in supporting those who came to Ukraine armed and ready to kill its citizens.
Such a policy greatly raises the status of people returning from the war. This, in turn, creates the fourth reason for the impossibility of ending the war - not only the increase in the number of radical patriots but also an increase in their influence in Russian society. Therefore, there may be a future conflict between the apolitical part of society and the aggressive "patriots" returning from the front. These people may begin to demand too much from the rest of the population, corrupted by impunity and the propaganda cult around them.
The real paradox lies in the fact that the Kremlin, even realizing this, sees only one way to delay the social upheaval: continuing its war against Ukraine. In reality, this method could smooth out the external manifestations of social conflicts, but at the same time, it will only exacerbate their causes. Thus, sooner or later, these conflicts will make themselves known within the Russian Federation.
In conclusion, Putin cannot end the war as currently constituted due to the high level of public support for the Russian authorities and him personally. The constant stream of propaganda paints a harrowing future in the case of Russia's defeat. Pro-Kremlin sociologists claim that the majority of Russian society remains apolitical, but the number of radical patriots who actively support the war is steadily growing. The public ratings of authorities depend on their degree of involvement in the war, guaranteeing votes in elections, and raising the status of people returning from the war. The Kremlin sees only one way to delay social upheaval: continuing its war against Ukraine, which may only exacerbate the causes of social conflicts within the Russian Federation.
